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Abstract
Purpose This paper reviews prior studies and presents a synthesis of the takeover
prediction literature spanning the period 1968-2018.
Design/methodology/approach The paper adopts a narrative review ap-
proach. It explores prior studies on takeover target prediction from a historical
perspective, focusing on the evolution and development of the literature over the
50-year period.
Findings From a historical development perspective, prior studies in the area can
be partitioned into four distinct eras. Studies in the 1st era (1968-1985) mainly es-
tablished that takeover targets share common characteristics which can be captured
with financial ratios. Studies in the 2nd era (1986-2002) developed and extended
formal target prediction hypotheses. These studies concluded that it was impossible
to build a successful investment strategy around takeover target prediction. Studies
in the 3rd era (2003-2009) explored similar questions using alternative modelling
techniques but arrive at similar results—targets can be predicted with limited ac-
curacy and target prediction is unlikely to lead to abnormal returns. Studies in the
4th era (2010-2018) explore implications of M&A predictability on share valuation,
governance and bond prices (amongst others), but most importantly, provide some
evidence that takeover prediction can lead to abnormal returns when combined
with appropriate screening strategies.
Originality/value This presents the first in-depth review of the literature on
takeover target prediction. It highlights the development of the literature over four
distinct eras and identifies several limitations, research gaps and opportunities for
future research. Given the recent decline in the literature (i.e., 4th era), our study
may stimulate new research in the area.
Keywords: Literature review, Narrative overview, M&A Targets, Target charac-
teristics, Takeover prediction.
1 Introduction
The prediction of corporate events, a feature of positive accounting theory (Watts and
Zimmerman, 1978), is prevalent in the Accounting and Finance literature. Here, prior
studies focus on continuous improvement of existing prediction models. For obvious
reasons, much of the prediction literature focuses on the prediction of bankrupt firms
(Agarwal and Taffler, 2008, 2007; Altman et al., 1968, 1977; Ohlson, 1980; Shumway,
2001; Taffler, 1984, amongst others), with comparatively fewer studies focusing on the
prediction of takeover targets (Brar et al., 2009; Danbolt et al., 2016; Palepu, 1986; Pow-
ell, 2001; Taussig and Hayes, 1968). Other issues which have also attracted some, albeit
very little, interest in the prediction literature include share repurchases (Dittmar, 2000),
credit ratings and credit rating changes (Pinches and Mingo, 1973) and loan decisions by
loan officers Dietrich and Kaplan (1982); Libby (1975). Several reviews of the bankruptcy
prediction literature are easily available (Alaka et al., 2018; Aziz and Dar, 2006; Jones
et al., 2017; Kumar and Ravi, 2007), and these are essential for synthesising and con-
solidating the extensive literature on the subject. To our knowledge, no prior study has
synthesised the takeover prediction literature—an issue which this study aims to address.
We explore the development of the takeover prediction literature over the last 50
years (1968-2018) and provide a timely synthesis of the literature. Given the lack of
prior reviews on the subject, we adopt a traditional narrative review approach (Green
et al., 2006; Hammersley, 2001) that allows us to initiate the process of consolidating the
literature. Our review focuses on four key areas; (i) the relevance of takeover prediction
modelling, (ii) theoretical underpinnings of takeover likelihood modelling, (iii) the em-
pirical research on takeover prediction; research objectives, key findings and conclusions,
and (iv) practitioner perspectives on takeover prediction. Our main findings are briefly
highlighted below and discussed in more detail later in our study.
Firstly, our review highlights the relevance of takeover prediction for investors, man-
agers, regulators and research. From an investor perspective, there is potential for target
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prediction to form the basis of a successful investment strategy given that significant
gains to takeover targets when deals are announced. From the perspective of managers,
knowledge of firms’ takeover likelihood allows managers to take action to safeguard and
protect the interest of their shareholders and other stakeholders (such as employees). For
regulators, target prediction provides a useful mechanism for identifying and investigat-
ing potential cases of insider trading in takeover targets ahead of the announcement of
takeover bids. From a research perspective, the usefulness of accounting information can
be directly evaluated based on its ability to predict future events including takeovers.
Takeover prediction, therefore, provides a lens through which the value relevance of fi-
nancial information can be assessed.
Secondly, we explore theoretical perspectives on why certain firms are targeted through
takeovers. Here we highlight two main theories; the “market for corporate control theory”
and the “misvaluation theory”, that have been advanced to underpin target prediction
modelling. The market for corporate control theory suggests that the takeover market
is an external mechanism for monitoring management action and resolving the agency
conflict. The market plays a role in replacing managers who do not maximise shareholder
value. The misvaluation theory suggests that the market’s inefficiency in the valuation of
firms drives takeover activity and the selection of targets. Specifically, bidders seeking to
make a quick profit target firms that are relatively undervalued. Several other theoretical
perspectives including; agency cost of free cash flow, transaction costs and information
asymmetry can be broadly subsumed under this theory.
Thirdly, we provide a narrative overview and map out the historical development
of the empirical literature on takeover prediction modelling. From a historical develop-
ment perspective, prior studies in the area can be partitioned into four distinct eras.
Studies in the 1st era (1968-1985) focus on identifying the characteristics of firms that
receive takeover bids. These studies do not follow a systematic process for identifying
target characteristics (e.g., by drawing from theory) as they mainly adopt data-driven
approaches including step-wise variable selection processes. These studies surmise that
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takeover targets share common characteristics which can be captured using a variety of
financial ratios. Studies in the 2nd era (1986-2002) developed and later extended for-
mal target prediction hypotheses. These hypotheses were motivated by and embedded
in theory and form the basis for takeover prediction in contemporary research. How-
ever, these studies also conclude that it is impossible to build a successful investment
strategy around takeover target prediction. Studies in the 3rd era (2003-2009) explore
similar questions using alternative modelling techniques including machine learning ap-
proaches, amongst others. Despite the adoption of more “advanced” methodologies and
computational techniques, these studies reconfirm the conclusions of studies in the 3rd
era—targets can be predicted with limited accuracy and target prediction is unlikely to
lead to abnormal returns. Studies in the 4th era (2010-2018) generally explore implica-
tions of M&A predictability on share valuation, governance and bond prices (amongst
others). These studies, for example, highlight the possibility that takeover likelihood
moderates the distribution of wealth between targets and acquirers during takeovers and
that takeover risk explains the cross-section of firm returns. More importantly, the stud-
ies in this era provide some evidence alluding to the possibility that takeover prediction
can lead to abnormal returns when combined with appropriate screening strategies.
Finally, our work explores practitioners’ perspectives on takeover prediction by draw-
ing from practitioner publications. We document early instances of takeover prediction
by practitioners drawing from the cases of E.H Hutton and Dreyfus Company in 1983.
We also discuss the cases of major investment banks (Morgan Stanley and Deutsche
Bank) who have made some of their prediction models public. Our evidence suggest that
practitioners actively engage in merger target prediction on account of the possibility of
developing successful investment strategies around prediction modelling.
Basing on our review, we highlight several opportunities for future research and areas
for development of the takeover prediction literature. Our work, therefore, contributes
to the extant literature by providing a timely synthesis of the research literature—a
useful tool for future researchers— and by identifying areas for future development of the
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literature.
The rest of our paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the relevance
of takeover prediction modelling. Section 3 explores the main theoretical perspectives
around target prediction modelling. Section 4 discusses prior studies on takeover like-
lihood modelling from a historical perspective based on the year of the journal article
publication. Section 5 discusses practitioners’ perspectives on takeover prediction by
looking at how practitioners have deployed prediction models as a tool for investment
decision-making. Concluding remarks are presented in section 6.
2 The relevance of takeover prediction modelling
Corporate events such as takeover and bankruptcy announcements usually result in signif-
icant price movements. Indeed, prior M&A research consistently documents significant
M&A announcement abnormal returns to targets but insignificant returns to bidders
(Andrade et al., 2001; Brooks et al., 2018; Bruner, 2002; Datta et al., 1992; Franks and
Harris, 1989; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; Graham et al., 2002; Jaffe et al., 2015;
Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Masulis et al., 2007; Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007; Wang and
Lahr, 2017). These studies suggest that targets gain upwards of 20% abnormal returns
when bids are announced. Hence, several target prediction studies are motivated by the
possibility of building a successful investment strategy around takeover prediction mod-
elling (Brar et al., 2009; Danbolt et al., 2016; Palepu, 1986; Powell, 2001). As expected
there is competition in the prediction market as prior evidence suggests active trading
prior to bid announcements. For example, Keown and Pinkerton (1981) find that over
half of the abnormal returns that accrue to targets of takeovers are earned prior to the
actual announcement day. While this might suggest that investors are better off buying
into targets early, targets tend to underperform in the period before they are acquired
(Morck et al., 1988), creating a timing risk for investors (Danbolt et al., 2016) and making
takeover prediction a non-trivial exercise.
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The employment effects of M&A on target managers, as well as, the tendency for
target managers to, typically, be ousted during the integration phase of M&A, is well
documented (Cannella Jr and Hambrick, 1993; Hambrick and Cannella Jr, 1993; Hartzell
et al., 2004). In many circles, a takeover is viewed as a sign of target management
inefficiency (Danbolt et al., 2016; Tunyi et al., 2019). Being able to anticipate future
takeover bids is therefore important to the management of potential target firms who
may want to take action to safeguard the interests of their shareholders or extract excess
managerial rent (Ruback, 1987). In contexts wherein the use of some takeover defence
strategies is legally appropriate, knowledge of takeover risk can allow managers to set
up applicable pre-bid or post-bid takeover defence strategies. These defensive strategies
can either make the firm unattractive as a potential target or may even allow target
management to generate a higher takeover premium (Holl and Kyriazis, 1997; Klock et al.,
2005; Schwert, 2000). Further, knowledge of the likelihood that a firm’s competitors and
supply chain partners will engage in M&A activity is, perhaps, important for the firm’s
long term strategy development.
Regulators such as the US Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the UK
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), as part of their role, continuously seek to iden-
tify insider trading, particularly around M&As. Keown and Pinkerton (1981) note that
takeovers are poorly held secrets as the takeover process generally involves several groups
and individuals (e.g., investment bankers, advisers, management) all of whom generally
hold material price-sensitive information not in the public domain. Events studies on
takeovers (Danbolt, 1995; Franks and Harris, 1989; Keown and Pinkerton, 1981, amongst
others) show that target share prices start rising up to four months before the bid an-
nouncement. Keown and Pinkerton (1981) attribute this growth in prices and the corre-
sponding increase in trading volume to information leakage and insider trading activity.
In contrast, Jensen and Ruback (1983) attribute the price run-up to the market’s an-
ticipation of imminent bids. Market regulators have a general duty to investigate, on a
case by case basis, whether such price run-ups are due to insider trading activity or mar-
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ket anticipation. To date, the literature focuses on testing the insider trading hypothesis,
perhaps, because market anticipation is non-observable. Prediction modelling potentially
provides regulators with a tool to investigate the extent to which some takeover targets
could have been anticipated by market participants using only publicly available infor-
mation. The results from such analyses could inform decisions on whether (or not) to
investigate potential cases of market abuse, with important cost implications.
Watts and Zimmerman (1990) argue that the role of positive accounting research is to
develop theory that can explain observed phenomena or occurrences. The decision model
paradigm (Riahi-Belkaoui, 1996) and the events approach of accounting theory (Sorter,
1969) are both centred on the provision of information about relevant economic events and
the development of appropriate models that may be useful in explaining and predicting
such events. This is also consistent with (Bartley and Boardman, 1990) contention that
the usefulness of accounting information can be directly evaluated by their ability to help
investors predict future events such as takeovers. It is within this context that several
studies have explored the usefulness of accounting data in explaining future takeovers
(Bartley and Boardman, 1986; Walter, 1994).
3 Theoretical underpinnings of takeover likelihood
modelling
Two main theoretical perspectives; the “market for corporate control theory” and the
“misvaluation theory”, have been advanced to underpin target prediction modelling. The
market for corporate control theory (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Manne, 1965) asserts that
the market for corporate control is an external mechanism for monitoring management
action and resolving the agency conflict. This market (also referred to as the takeover
market) is one in which various management teams (i.e., the acquirer and other competing
acquirers) compete for the rights to manage a firm’s resources Jensen and Ruback (1983);
Manne (1965). The theory suggests that managers who perform poorly or take decisions
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that do not maximise shareholder wealth are susceptible to takeover bids from competing
management teams better able to maximise shareholder wealth. The market for corporate
control theory forms the basis for the development of several hypotheses around what
drivers takeover likelihood (see, for stance, Danbolt et al., 2016; Palepu, 1986; Powell,
1997). For example, Palepu (1986) puts forward a “management inefficiency hypothesis”
which suggests that firm accounting and market under-performance drives takeovers due
to competition in the market for corporate control. Manne (1965) contends that the
takeover market makes the corporate world a more efficient one by ensuring that managers
who deviate from the best interest of their shareholders are replaced by more efficient
management teams.
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Dong et al. (2006) advance the misvaluation theory
which suggests that that the stock market’s inefficiency in the valuation of firms has
important effects on takeover activity. As suggested by Dong et al. (2006), the effects arise
from bidders’ deliberate efforts to profit from acquisitions by buying undervalued targets
at a price below fundamental value using cash as a method of payment, or by exchanging
equity for targets that, even if overvalued, are less overvalued when compared to the
bidder. Several studies (Ang and Cheng, 2006; Bi and Gregory, 2011; Dong et al., 2006)
investigate how misvaluation (either overvaluation or undervaluation) of both targets and
bidders moderates takeover decisions. Consistent with the market for corporate theory
(management inefficiency hypothesis), the market’s inefficiency in valuing certain firms
may arise if managers are ineffective in communicating the value of their firms to investors
through their decisions and reporting activity.
Besides the two main theoretical perspectives explaining the choice of merger targets,
other studies have advanced agency cost of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986; Powell, 1997),
transaction cost (Tunyi, 2019) and information asymmetry (Ambrose and Megginson,
1992a) perspectives which can inform the selection of takeover targets. These perspectives
can however be subsumed or deemed as extensions of the market for corporate control
theory. For brevity, we do not discuss them further.
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4 Empirical studies on takeover likelihood modelling
4.1 Overview of the empirical literature
Given the extensive nature and long history of the research area, a historical perspective
is adopted in this review. Here, the studies are discussed based on the era during which
they are published. While not clearly distinct from each other, four key eras can be
identified. These eras span 1968–1985 (first era), 1986–2002 (second era), 2003–2009
(third era) and 2010-2018 (fourth era). The basis for this classification is the realisation
that studies published during each of these four eras share significant similarities in their
focus and conclusions.
The studies in the first era generally explore the characteristics or profile of takeover
targets and the factors that make certain firms attractive to bidders. The second stream of
studies broadly focuses on developing predictive models and employing different empirical
techniques to improve the accuracy of target prediction. The third stream generally
assesses whether takeover prediction models can be used to generate abnormal returns
for investors. The fourth stream of studies considers the implications of takeover target
predictability on firm decisions and behaviour. We discuss some of the key studies in the
sections that follow.
4.2 Studies in takeover prediction 1968–1985: First era
Several related studies published during this maiden era focused on the characteristics
of takeover targets and whether targets could be differentiated from other firms ex-ante.
We present a summary of the key studies in Table 1. Taussig and Hayes (1968) appear to
be the earliest study on takeover prediction modelling. The study investigates whether
firms which failed to provide sufficient information (i.e., choose accounting policies which
reduce disclosure) to investors are more likely to be acquired. Using a US sample of 50
targets and 50 non-targets between 1956 and 1967 and conducting a univariate analysis
on a set of accounting variables (including inventories to total assets, net fixed assets
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to total assets and book value to market value) the study finds that over-conservative
accounting policies do not increase a firm’s likelihood of being acquired. Instead, poor
investment policies (i.e., excess liquid assets), a low return on net worth, and a declining
(or unpredictable) dividend pay-out are features of takeover targets (Taussig and Hayes,
1968).
Vance (1969) identifies four variables (including include liquidity, debt position, price-
earnings ratio and stability of earnings) that are indicators of a firm’s vulnerability to
takeovers. The author develops a raider’s index based on these variables and suggested
that this index could guide management on the likelihood of being the subject of a
takeover.
Following on from Vance (1969), Monroe and Simkowitz (1971) seek to improve upon
the methodology of earlier studies through their use of stepwise discriminant analysis and
a broader set of financial variables. They employ discriminant analysis based on 24 firm
financial characteristics on a sample of listed US firms in 1968 to discriminate between
future targets and non-targets. The authors observe that future targets and non-targets
can be distinguished based on both their financial and non-financial characteristics. They
conclude that acquired firms have a lower PE ratio, paid out lower dividends, experienced
low growth in equity and are generally smaller in size.
The use of stepwise discriminant analysis by Monroe and Simkowitz (1971) appears to
have paved the way for methodological criticisms and development in the research area.
Stevens (1973), for example, apply factor analysis––a variable reduction technique which
is, perhaps, theoretically more robust than stepwise analysis. By using factor analysis and
multiple discriminant analyses, Stevens (1973) finds that future targets and non-target
firms can be distinguished from each other based on their financial characteristics. The
author employs an equal sample of 40 targets and 40 non-targets from US publicly listed
firms in 1966 to show that targets have lower leverage, lower profitability and higher
liquidity.
[Insert Table 1 here]
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Singh and Singh (1971) is, perhaps, the earliest UK study investigating the unique
financial characteristics of UK targets. The researchers employ univariate and discrimi-
nant analysis on a sample of 847 UK firms which operated between 1954 and 1960. The
study finds that, when compared with non-targets, UK targets have lower profitability,
lower growth and lower valuation ratios. Tzoannos and Samuels (1972) build on Singh
and Singh (1971) by investigating the differences between the characteristics of targets,
bidders and non-merging UK firms using discriminant analysis. The study reveals that
UK targets have high levels of capital, experienced a growth in gearing and a decline in
profits, have low P/E ratios, low dividend growth rates and were inconsistent in their
dividend pay-outs. Bidders, on the other hand, have low levels of capital and reported
falling gearing ratios, growing dividends and growing profitability.
Kuehn (1975) extends Tzoannos and Samuels (1972) by employing a longer sample
period from 1957 to 1959 and linear probability and probit models to investigate the
characteristics of UK targets and bidders. Kuehn (1975) finds that UK targets are char-
acterised by low valuation ratios, profitability ratios, liquidity levels and growth. UK
bidders, on the other hand, have high valuation ratios and growth levels but low prof-
itability ratios when compared to their industry average (Kuehn, 1975).
Wansley et al. (1983) do not set out to predict future targets per se, but to investi-
gate whether firms with a high degree of resemblance to acquired firms earn abnormal
risk-adjusted returns. This study, perhaps, represents one of the earliest attempts to
use takeover likelihood modelling as a portfolio selection tool. Wansley et al. (1983)
employ discriminant analysis and a broad set of firm accounting and market variables
(including profitability, size, leverage, age, liquidity, price-earnings, stock activity, mar-
ket valuation, growth, turnover, and dividend policy) to derive models that discriminate
between targets and non-target firms. By holding a portfolio of 25 firms with target
characteristics, Wansley et al. (1983) show that cumulative abnormal returns of up to
17.1% can be generated over a 21 month holding period (between 1979-1980). Aside from
significantly expanding the set of potential discriminatory variables in target prediction
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studies, this study was one of the first to highlight the possibility that a portfolio of firms
with semblance to merger targets might generate abnormal returns for investors. Other
studies in this era looking at characteristics of takeover targets include Canadian studies
by Rege (1984) and Belkaoui (1978) and US studies by Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) and
Hasbrouck (1985).
4.3 Studies in takeover prediction 1986–2002: Second era
There is a noticeable decline in the number of studies exploring takeover prediction dur-
ing the 1986–2002 period. This decline can, perhaps, be attributed to the Palepu (1986)
study which concluded that, when the empirical analysis is done correctly, takeover pre-
diction, especially for investment purposes, is an unattainable goal. Besides the Palepu
(1986) study, several US (see, for example, Ambrose and Megginson, 1992b; Bartley and
Boardman, 1986, 1990; Walter, 1994) and UK studies (see, for example, Barnes, 1990,
1999, 2000; Powell, 1997, 2001) were also published during this era. In our search, we did
not find any studies published for other regions such as Canada, Australia and the rest
of Europe. We present a summary of the papers published during this era in Table 1.
Palepu (1986) is considered a seminal study in the area and has been recurrently cited
in contemporary studies. The main contribution of this paper is that it brings to light
some methodological biases in earlier (1968–1985) takeover and bankruptcy prediction
studies and proposes an improved framework for modelling takeover likelihood. This
starts with the development of theoretically grounded prediction hypotheses to guide
the selection of predictor variables. Palepu (1986) proposes six hypotheses for takeover
prediction (including management inefficiency, growth resource mismatch, industry dis-
turbance, size, market-to-book and price-earnings hypotheses) and three key weaknesses
in prior research methodologies (including the use of non-random equal-share samples in
model estimation, the use of arbitrary cut-off points in target prediction, and the use of
equal-share samples in prediction tests). Palepu (1986) concludes that the model’s ex-
planatory power and predictive ability were quite low. This finding was consistent with
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the observation that the stock market does not seem to predict targets in advance of
takeover announcements (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). Importantly, (Palepu, 1986) con-
cedes that it was impossible to earn significant abnormal returns by investing in predicted
acquisition targets.
Ambrose and Megginson (1992b) extend the Palepu (1986) study by exploring the
effect of asset structure, institutional shareholdings and takeover defences on takeover
likelihood using a sample of 169 targets and 267 non-targets pulled from the period
1979–1986. The study finds that US targets are characterised by a high proportion of
fixed or tangible assets within their asset structure. Tangible assets, potentially, proxies
for operational synergies between targets and bidders, its availability improves the ease
of valuation of potential targets and proxies for asset-rich firms in declining industries
(Ambrose and Megginson, 1992b). Additionally, Ambrose and Megginson (1992b) find
that the Palepu (1986) prediction model has little explanatory power when re-estimated
using their sample as none of the Palepu (1986) hypotheses are validated out-of-sample.
The suggestion from the Ambrose and Megginson (1992b) finding is that very little is
known about the characteristics of targets.
Other related US studies during this era (Bartley and Boardman, 1986, 1990; Wal-
ter, 1994) do not directly focus on takeover prediction for investment purposes. These
studies (Bartley and Boardman, 1986, 1990; Walter, 1994) generally use variants of the
Palepu (1986) model to evaluate the value-relevance of accounting information. Bartley
and Boardman (1986), for example, test whether the ratio of market value to inflation-
adjusted book value is better able to classify targets than the ratio of market value to
historical book value. The study finds that prediction models with inflation-adjusted
financial ratios are better able to classify targets and non-targets when compared to
historical cost ratios. Walter (1994) also investigates the usefulness of current costs ac-
counting data (replacement costs) by testing whether target prediction models developed
with such accounting data can be useful to investors. Walter (1994) shows that current
cost models improve the explanatory power of prediction models. The studies conclude
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that inflation-adjusted (Bartley and Boardman, 1986, 1990) and current cost accounting
data (Walter, 1994) are more value-relevant to users when compared to historical cost
accounting data.
Besides the UK studies published in this era (Barnes, 1990, 1998, 1999, 2000; Powell,
1997, 2001), a few studies look at Greek samples (Slowinski et al., 1997; Zanakis and
Zopounidis, 1997). Powell (1997) adopts the hypotheses the Palepu (1986) hypotheses
alongside a multinomial framework for takeover prediction based on his contention that
hostile and friendly targets have different characteristics. The study contends that the use
of a binomial modelling framework (see, for example, Palepu, 1986) is suboptimal and
might lead to incorrect conclusions about the factors driving takeovers. Additionally,
Powell (1997) finds that the characteristics of targets change over time and prediction
models developed based on the Palepu (1986) hypotheses, have a very low explanatory
power. Powell (1997) argues that the Palepu (1986) hypotheses which form are basis pre-
diction modelling across many studies either lacked validity or are inadequately captured
by empirical proxies. This position is supported by other studies including Barnes (1998)
who also find evidence that the use of the Palepu (1986) hypotheses was ineffective in
predicting future takeover targets.
Barnes (1990, 1999) extend the work of Palepu (1986) by highlighting other method-
ological weaknesses of prior research in takeover prediction. Firstly, Barnes (1999) notes
that several studies ignore the statistical assumptions that underlie regression estimation
procedures such as “multivariate normality” and “equal-group dispersion matrices across
all groups”. These assumptions are rarely met as financial ratios, which are generally used
as predictor variables, are less likely to be normal and more likely to be skewed. Barnes
(1999) proposes the use of industry-relative ratios to circumvent this problem. Secondly,
Barnes (1999) highlights the issue of model stability over time and across industries if
it is going to be of use to investors. Building on Barnes (1999), Barnes (2000) uses a
UK sample to test the extent to which targets can be predicted, comparing different
models and different variable specifications. Even after including anticipatory share price
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changes as a new independent variable, Barnes (2000) finds that none of his models (the
industry-specific model or the general model) can correctly predict targets out of sample.
Similar to Powell (1997), Powell (2001) adopts the Palepu (1986) prediction hypothe-
ses to estimate the likelihood of a firm being acquired. Powell (2001) extends Powell
(1997) by also testing whether abnormal returns can be generated by holding a portfolio
of firms predicted as potential targets by the model. The study proposes an alterna-
tive strategy for determining optimal out-of-sample cut-off probabilities which takes into
account the investment objective of prediction modelling. The Powell (2001) classifica-
tion rule, when applied to the holdout samples, results in smaller predicted samples with
higher takeover probabilities compared to the Palepu (1986) procedure.
In the empirical part of the analysis, Powell (2001) employs an equal-share UK sample
of 471 targets and 471 non-targets to develop his model. The model is tested out-of-
sample by using fresh data from 1996. The model predicts that 216 firms will receive
a bid in the next period, of which only 7 (or 3.24%) of these firms received such a bid.
The next stage in the study involves holding a portfolio of all predicted targets over
the one year period. Powell (2001) finds that, despite the methodological improvements
introduced in the study, the portfolio of predicted targets generated significantly negative
abnormal returns during the holding period.
4.4 Studies in takeover prediction 2003-2009: Third era
The second era (1986–2002) is marked by a general contention that it is difficult, if not
impossible, for takeover prediction to form the basis of a successful investment strategy.
The primary reason advanced for this is that target prediction models are inefficient as
high levels of prediction errors are recorded (Palepu, 1986; Powell, 2001). This, perhaps,
explains why many studies post-2002, focus on the use of new computational techniques
to improve prior takeover prediction models (Espahbodi and Espahbodi, 2003; Powell,
2004; Powell and Yawson, 2007).
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Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003) employs both non-parametric (recursive partition-
ing) and parametric tests (discriminant, logit and probit models) along-side the Palepu
(1986) state-based sampling methodology to develop takeover prediction models for US
targets. Aside from using financial variables similar to those in Palepu (1986), Espah-
bodi and Espahbodi (2003) investigate the predictive potential of several non-financial
variables such as anti-takeover regulation, the presence of poison pills defensive strate-
gies, the presence of golden parachutes, directors’ ownership within the company. Using
a stepwise elimination procedure, the study identifies the optimal predictor variables as
free cash flow to total assets, golden parachute dummy, Delaware dummy and equity
market value to total firm-value. Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003), however, find that
their models poorly predicted future targets.
Powell (2004) builds on Powell (1997) which proposes a multinomial framework for
predicting takeover targets—a framework which differentiates between friendly and hos-
tile targets. Powell (2004) argues that the characteristics of hostile takeover targets are
markedly different from those of friendly takeover targets given the fact that the motive
for hostile takeovers is to enforce discipline while that of friendly takeovers is to achieve
synergies. Powell (2004) contends that a multinomial framework (as opposed to a simple
binomial framework) that takes into account the characteristics of the event (hostile or
friendly) should result in models with more explanatory power and hence, better predic-
tive abilities. Powell (2004) hypothesises that friendly targets are more likely to be small
firms in financial distress, having low levels of liquidity and high leverage while hostile
targets are more likely to be profitable firms.
Powell (2004) employs a UK sample consisting of an estimation sample of 9,891 firm-
years drawn from 1986 to 1995 and a holdout sample of 1,000 firm-years drawn from 1996.
The study reports poor model predictive ability as all models (multinomial and binomial)
misclassified a large number of non-targets as targets and no model achieves a better-
than-chance predictive ability. Aside from a significant difference in the size of friendly
and hostile targets, the results from the model do not lend support to the contention
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that friendly and hostile targets have substantial differences. The theorised benefits of a
multinomial modelling framework are not, therefore, empirically confirmed in this study.
Further, the number of hostile targets in the sample is, perhaps, too few (zero in some
years) for a multinomial model to be of any substantial benefit. This relative scarcity in
the number of hostile targets limits further research on this issue.
Powell and Yawson (2007) focus on factors driving restructuring events. The study
investigates whether the variables frequently used in takeover prediction (Ambrose and
Megginson, 1992b; Palepu, 1986; Powell, 2001) also explain other restructuring events
such as layoffs, bankruptcies and divestitures. Powell and Yawson (2007) employ a sam-
ple of 482 takeovers, 82 bankruptcies, 360 divestitures and 631 layoffs in UK firms between
1992 and 2002. During this period there were no restructuring events in 8,048 firm-year
observations. Using a multinomial model, Powell and Yawson (2007) find evidence that
takeover targets, firms involved in divestitures and bankrupt firms are all characterised by
declining stock returns. The results from the analysis reveal that the variables frequently
used in takeover prediction also explain divestitures, layoffs and bankruptcies. This sug-
gests that the set of prediction hypotheses used across prior studies in takeover prediction
(Ambrose and Megginson, 1992b; Palepu, 1986; Powell, 2001) does not comprehensively
capture the unique strategic motives of takeovers.
Ouzounis et al. (2009) employ a UK sample of 416 takeover targets and 1,160 non-
targets between 2001 and 2005 to explore the characteristics of targets. The study finds
that targets are significantly larger, potentially undervalued and less profitable when
compared to non-targets. The finding on firm size is consistent with Powell and Yawson
(2007) but in contrast to evidence which suggests that targets are, on average, smaller
than non-targets (see, for example, Palepu, 1986; Powell, 2004, 2001; Walter, 1994). The
finding that targets have more inefficient management teams and are generally underval-
ued corroborates earlier research findings (see, for example, Palepu, 1986; Powell, 2001;
Walter, 1994).
Several studies explore the performance of non-parametric techniques for prediction.
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Ouzounis et al. (2009) explore the performance of other non-parametric methods such
as Utilités Additives Discriminantes (UTADIS), Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) and
Support Vector Machines (SVM). Other UK studies such as Pasiouras and Tanna (2010);
Pasiouras et al. (2007) have also explored the use of non-parametric models including
Multi-group Hierarchical Discrimination Method (MHDIS) and UTADIS in the prediction
of UK targets. The objective of these studies is generally to compare the discriminatory
ability of these new techniques and not to predict future targets per se. These studies
generally find limited evidence that the more sophisticated non-parametric methodologies
consistently outperform a simple discriminant analysis model.
Outside the US and US, a few studies during this era explore takeover prediction
using EU samples. While some researchers have employed a European Union-wide ap-
proach (Brar et al., 2009), others focus on a single European country (Tsagkanos et al.,
2007). In a cross-country European study, Brar et al. (2009) posit that the takeover pre-
diction models that incorporate share price momentum and trading volume can generate
abnormal returns. The study employs the Palepu (1986) hypotheses together with the
state-based sampling methodology (Palepu, 1986). Brar et al. (2009) report that Euro-
pean targets were smaller than non-targets, undervalued, with low liquidity and low sales
growth. European targets were also found to exhibit strong short-term price momentum
and their shares are actively traded prior to takeover announcements (Brar et al., 2009).
Controversially, Brar et al. (2009) conclude that it was possible to generate significant
abnormal returns by investing in predicted targets. Their results are, however, prone
to look-ahead-bias as their model is tested on the same sample used to develop model
parameters.
Tsagkanos et al. (2007), on the other hand, focus on a single EU country by devel-
oping a target prediction model for Greece. The study employs a set of variables which
presumably have unique influences in the Greek economy and a strategic bearing on the
decision to acquire Greek firms. Tsagkanos et al. (2007) find that Greek targets are
generally larger, with high productivity, accumulated experience and good financial per-
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formance. While the study only focuses on a small economy, it highlights the importance
of country or context on the choice of prediction variables. It also shows that the rela-
tionship between takeover probability and firm variables (e.g., firm size) is likely to be
context-dependent.
4.5 Studies in takeover prediction 2010-2018: Fourth era
There is a significant decline in the number of papers exploring issues around takeover
prediction post-2009. While one of the studies in this era focuses on exploring charac-
teristics of IPO firms that quickly become targets (De and Jindra, 2012), and the other
(Rodrigues and Stevenson, 2013) alternative empirical strategies for improving prediction
model performance, the main studies in this era (including Bhanot et al. (2010); Cornett
et al. (2011); Cremers et al. (2009)) employ takeover probabilities as a key input variable
to investigate different research questions. Cremers et al. (2009), for example, develop a
model to predict takeover targets, with the objective of testing the impact of takeover
likelihood on firm valuation i.e., whether takeover likelihood is reflected in share prices.
In the study, the takeover likelihood is defined as a probit function of a firm’s Q ratio,
tangible assets, cash resources, blockholders’ dummy, size, industry leverage and return
on assets. Cremers et al. (2009) find that portfolios based on a takeover factor generate
annualised mean abnormal returns of up to 7.95%. Nonetheless, these returns are not
explained by the targets in the sample as the returns persist (at a similar magnitude)
when actual targets are excluded from the sample. The study concludes that a takeover
factor (derived from firm takeover likelihood) partly explains the cross-section of firm
returns.
Bhanot et al. (2010) investigate the effect of a firm’s takeover risk on the relationship
between its stock returns and bond prices. The authors defined takeover risk as a function
of firm size, market to book ratio, excess returns, EBITDA, R&D, level of tangible
property, leverage, percentage of institutional ownership and one-year price volatility.
Only completed takeovers are considered and a probit regression model is used to obtain
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the takeover probability. No validation tests are conducted to ascertain the validity of
the model in computing firm takeover probability. Bhanot et al. (2010) find that takeover
risk explains the correlation between stock returns and bond prices.
Cornett et al. (2011) investigate investors’ anticipation of bidder and target candidacy
in takeovers and whether this anticipation moderates the wealth distribution between bid-
ders and targets in takeovers. In the research design, bid probability or risk of takeover
for targets is used to develop a measure of market anticipation. Cornett et al. (2011)
model bid probability as a logit function of sales shock, size, change in size, industry
concentration, growth-resource mismatch, return on assets, cash ratio, price run-up, in-
formation asymmetry and participation in previous mergers. Similar to Cremers et al.
(2009) and Bhanot et al. (2010), Cornett et al. (2011) do not explore the validity of their
prediction model. Cornett et al. (2011) conclude that differences in investor anticipation
of merger candidates explain the differences in returns to acquirers and targets.
The validity of the latter studies (Bhanot et al., 2010; Cornett et al., 2011; Cremers
et al., 2009) is, perhaps, reliant on their models’ efficiency in measuring takeover risk.
These three studies do not, however, test whether the models can predict future targets.
Further, the variables used in the definition of takeover risk in these three studies are a
mix of the variables that have recurrently been used and criticised (for lacking explanatory
power) in prior empirical research. Perhaps, the true test of a prediction model or one
that measures takeover risk is not whether it generates abnormal returns (Cremers et al.,
2009) but whether it can predict the event in question (future targets or bidders). It is
unclear whether a more optimal takeover risk model will alter the conclusions of these
studies.
A recent study by Danbolt et al. (2016) re-examines whether portfolios of predicted
targets can form the basis of a profitable investment strategy. The study argues that
portfolios of predicted targets systematically underperform for the following three reasons.
• Prediction errors; Several non-targets are identified as potential targets thus diluting
portfolio returns.
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• Poor timing; Prediction models select targets either too early thus picking up target
pre-bid underperformance or too late thus missing the announcement day returns.
• Misclassification of distressed/bankrupt firms as potential targets; Distressed and
target firms share several characteristics (Powell and Yawson, 2007) but distressed
firms earn -100% returns as hence, dilute returns to predicted target portfolios.
While the prediction errors and poor timing are challenging to address, Danbolt et al.
(2016) suggest a simple screening strategy for addressing the misclassification problem.
The study finds that significant abnormal returns can be earned from target portfolios
screened for size, leverage and liquidity—characteristics which differentiate distressed
firms from takeover targets.
5 Practitioner perspectives on takeover prediction
Given the practical implication of takeover prediction and the potential usefulness to
investors such as fund managers, it is not surprising that practitioners have also been in-
volved in takeover predictions as a basis for investment strategies. Wansley et al. (1983)
highlight two early cases of investment firms (E.H Hutton and Dreyfus Company) with
investment strategies centred on investing in potential takeover targets. Wansley et al.
(1983) note that E.H Hutton regularly published its “Acquisition Candidates” brochure
devoted to identifying stocks with a high probability of being acquired. The Dreyfus
Company also managed a Merger and Acquisition Fund with the goal of investing in
firms which are likely acquisition targets (Wansley et al., 1983). While several invest-
ment firms claim to employ target prediction models as the basis of their investment
strategies, the models employed by these firms are proprietary and hence not disclosed.
Interestingly, Morgan Stanley IQ and strategists at Deutsche Bank have published the
takeover prediction models these firms employ as part of their investment strategies. This
published material can therefore provide some useful insights into the practitioners’ ap-
proach to takeover prediction modelling as an investment strategy. The approaches used
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by these institutions are discussed below.
Morgan Stanley runs a Target Equity Index Family (TEIF) as part of its Intelligent
Investing programme (Morgan Stanley IQ, 2008, 2013). This family is a group of five
funds made up of a World Target Equity Index, a Europe Target Equity Index, a US
Target Equity Index, a UK Target Equity Index and a Japan Target Equity Index. The
objective of the Target Equity Index Family was to select undervalued stocks that may be
potential takeover targets (Morgan Stanley IQ, 2008). What is intriguing about the pre-
diction of potential targets by Morgan Stanley is the simplicity of the model/methodology
employed. The firm indicates that the TEIF, “. . . uses a screening process that is quanti-
tative, rules-based and transparent. It ranks and selects stocks using inputs from publicly
available firm data to create a series of global, regional and country indices” (Morgan
Stanley IQ, 2008, p.2). The firm simply ranks stocks based on five financial character-
istics (including the ratio of free cash flow to enterprise value, interest cover, dividend
yield, the ratio of enterprise value to fixed assets and the ratio of share price to book
value then selects the 50 stocks with the best ranking across all variables to form the
target equity index.
Based on self-reported performance in “back-tests” between April 2001 and July 2007
Morgan Stanley IQ (2013), the UK (or world) Target Equity Index generated a total
annualised return of 14.40% (or 17.10%) while a broad-based index such as the Morgan
Stanley Capital Index (MSCI) UK (or world) generated an annualised return of 6.40%
(or 0.5%) during the same period. This leads to an excess return of 8.10% (UK) or
16.60% (world). In “live tests”, Morgan Stanley IQ (2013) reports that the target equity
index did not out-performed the MSCI between July 2007 and April 2013. The Morgan
Stanley World Target Equity earned an annualised return of –1.5% as against the –0.9%
annualised return earned by the MSCI world index. The results show that on a risk-
adjusted basis, the model does not generate returns higher than those of the market. In
fact, the strategy underperforms the market.
The Cahan et al. (2011) paper is developed by five quantitative strategists working
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at Deutsche Bank. To develop their prediction models, the strategists employ the vari-
ables used in Brar et al. (2009) together with informed trading, high-frequency trading
and technical trading variables. These variables attempt to capture the sentiments of
other market participants (such as option traders, technical traders and high-frequency
traders) by examining the minute-to-minute movements in stock prices. By employing
a logit regression model on the sample of Russell 3000 stocks, the strategists find that
targets have a higher price to earnings, lower price to book, higher gearing, good gross
margins, are within active M&A sectors, have lower trading volume, lower market capital-
isation, higher total assets, lower price volatility, fat tails in daily returns, higher option
trading volume and positive intraday return skewness. Cahan et al. (2011), on average,
achieve a target concentration of just 0.8% (worse the random prediction) using their
high-frequency model which predicts targets on a monthly basis. When its abnormal
returns are considered, the model substantially underperforms the market in all periods
between June 2001 and June 2011.
6 Concluding remarks
6.1 Summary of main findings
This study synthesises and consolidates 50 years of research on takeover target prediction.
We achieve this by exploring (i) the motivations for or relevance of takeover prediction
modelling, (ii) the objectives, key findings and conclusions from prior empirical research
on takeover prediction and (iii) the perspectives of practitioners engaged in target pre-
diction for investment strategy purposes.
In terms of the relevance of takeover prediction modelling, we document the impor-
tance of takeover prediction for investors, management, and regulators. Specifically, we
highlight (i) the potential for investors to generate abnormal returns by investing in port-
folios of predicted targets, (ii) the need for managers to be aware of their firms’ risk
of becoming the subject of a takeover bid, and (iii) the potential for target prediction
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models to aid regulators in their bid to narrow down potential cases of insider trading
ahead of takeover announcements.
We identify four distinct eras (1968–1985, 1986–2002, 2003–2009 and 2010–2018) in
the empirical research on takeover prediction and document the development of the lit-
erature across these four eras. The first era is characterised by the finding that target
selection is non-random and targets share some discernable characteristics. Irrespective
of context (US, UK, Canada), most of the studies seem to agree that targets are charac-
terised by low valuation ratios (i.e., targets are potentially undervalued firms), unstable
or falling dividends and low profitability ratios (i.e., targets are, on average, poorly per-
forming firms). The studies also establish that financial and market variables can act as
reasonable proxies for the motives of takeovers. Besides significant methodological weak-
nesses, these studies fail to provide a theoretical framework underlying the selection of
variables in the models. The studies neither discuss the choice of discriminatory variables
nor hypothesise on the relationship between variables and takeover likelihood.
The second era is marked by the Palepu (1986) which has formed the cornerstone of
takeover prediction to date. The study introduced a theoretical framework for selection
predictor variables, as well as, an improved methodology for takeover prediction. Other
studies during the era contribute by further developing new hypotheses (Ambrose and
Megginson, 1992b; Powell, 1997) and by extending the Palepu (1986) methodology (see,
for example, Barnes, 1999; Powell, 2001). Most studies during this era concluded that
portfolios of predicted are unlikely to generate abnormal returns (Barnes, 2000; Palepu,
1986; Powell, 1997, 2001). Importantly, several studies in this era (see, for example,
Ambrose and Megginson, 1992b; Barnes, 2000; Powell, 1997, 2001) highlight the lack of
comprehensiveness, sufficiency and validity of the Palepu (1986) hypotheses and predic-
tion variables.
The third era is characterised by a general shift in research focus from developing
predictive variables/hypotheses (i.e., understanding the factors that drive takeovers) to-
wards an agenda of testing the ability of different empirical and computational techniques
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(parametric and non-parametric discriminatory models) to predict future targets. The
studies in this era (see, for example, Espahbodi and Espahbodi, 2003; Ouzounis et al.,
2009; Pasiouras and Tanna, 2010; Pasiouras et al., 2007; Powell, 2004; Powell and Yawson,
2007) implicitly assume that the Palepu (1986) hypotheses fully explain the underlying
rationales for takeover. This, perhaps, explains why most of the studies adopt the Palepu
(1986) hypotheses but try to improve upon his computational model (logit) by employing
multinomial models and non-parametric models. The results derived from the different
parametric and non-parametric models employed in many of the studies indicate that
these new computational techniques do not, in many cases, improve the accuracy of
takeover prediction models. Generally, the models correctly predict very few targets and
in so doing misclassify very many non-targets as targets. The effect is that the promised
returns to takeover prediction have not been achieved, unless when substantial bias is
incorporated in the study.
The studies in the fourth era build on existing target prediction models. The studies
examined (Bhanot et al., 2010; Cornett et al., 2011; Cremers et al., 2009) do not ex-
plicitly recognise the limitations of existing models—particularly, the recurrent finding
that these models are unable to correctly predict targets out-of-sample and hence, have
low explanatory power. While these studies have broken new ground by exploring how
takeover likelihood influences stock and bond valuation, as well as, the wealth distribu-
tion between acquirers and targets during M&As, the question of the appropriateness of
these models is yet to be addressed. The Danbolt et al. (2016) study, partly, explains
why target portfolios systematically underperform but did not address the fundamental
issue of low out-of-sample predictive ability of these models.
There is evidence that practitioners are involved in prediction modelling. The models
employed by practitioners range from simple ranking strategies (Morgan Stanley IQ,
2008, 2013) to models which incorporate high-frequency data (Cahan et al., 2011). The
conclusions from practitioner research are generally consistent with the evidence from
academic research—portfolios of predicted targets do not generate abnormal returns.
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Overall, practitioner models neither have a superior predictive ability nor a superior
ability to generate above-normal returns for investors.
6.2 Areas for future research
As is evidenced by this narrative review, after 50 years of research on the subject, it
appears little is known about the factors that drive the selection of takeover targets.
Results appear to be vastly different across studies depending on chosen samples, time
periods, variables and empirical proxies, methodological choices for modelling, strategies
for out-of-sample identification or selection of prospective targets and alternative frame-
works for testing model performance. Perhaps, the shift towards the application of more
advanced and non-parametric models (as evident in the third era) is pre-mature as a
solid foundation for prediction modelling is yet to be laid. For example, evidence from
Ambrose and Megginson (1992b) and Powell and Yawson (2007) suggest that the Palepu
(1986) hypotheses do not explain the strategic rationale for takeovers. A potential way
forward is for researchers in the area to revisit the development of predictive hypotheses
as knowledge about what motivations/factors drive takeovers is still incomplete. Some
recent studies (Tunyi, 2019; Tunyi et al., 2019) have started to explore these issues. To
facilitate this process, a systematic review which identifies the key themes and discusses
in the literature is likely to pave the way for further studies.
It is unclear whether target characteristics and hence, prediction models, are stable
over time and across contexts. In the area of bankruptcy prediction, as well as other
areas such as the modelling of financial constraints, coefficients developed several decades
ago (see, for example, Altman et al., 1968; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Taffler, 1984;
Whited and Wu, 2006) are readily used by contemporary researchers to compute variables
such as bankruptcy risk (e.g., Altman Zeta, Taffler Z score) and the level of financial
constraints (e.g., KZ-index, WW-index). Due to the level of complexity involved in
modelling takeover likelihood, future researchers are likely to benefit from established
empirical models for quickly computing firms’ takeover likelihood which are similar to
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existing models for computing bankruptcy risk.
Recent studies such as Danbolt et al. (2016) have suggested strategies for improving
prediction models and enhancing portfolio returns. There is the need for these strategies
to be tested across different contexts and time periods. In this regard, with the exception
of Tunyi and Ntim (2016) which explores antecedents of takeovers in an African context,
there is a dearth of research exploring takeover prediction beyond the Western world.
Our review of the takeover prediction literature focuses on the prediction of targets.
It is worth noting that a few studies have attempted to develop models to predict ac-
quirers (Cornett et al., 2011; Tunyi, 2020). There are therefore opportunities to develop
integrated frameworks for matching acquirers and targets. This will be facilitated by
further studies exploring the profile of acquirers.
Finally, most target prediction studies explore portfolio performance without taking
into consideration some of the practical challenges of portfolio investment. For exam-
ple, the studies do not consider restrictions on portfolio sizes (e.g., small investors who
constitute a substantial proportion of investors hold small portfolios) or the implications
of transaction costs. Several studies employ large portfolios with significant portfolio
turnover and hence, round-trip costs. In addition, some studies apply hedge strategies
which substantially increases these transaction costs. These costs can severely limit the
profitability of portfolio strategies but have been ignored by prior research. Future studies
can therefore explore how portfolio size and transaction costs influence the profitability
of target prediction strategies.
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